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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Background
The annual value of financial transactions has
increased very rapidly in the past decade, reach-
ing a level about seventy times greater than global
GDP. The crisis has dented, but not reversed, this
growth while greatly increasing public support for
taxing financial transactions.
Aim
The key question of this paper is: should financial
transactions be taxed?
The case for a tax on financial transactions simply
to raise more revenue from the financial sector to
pay for the cost of the crisis is not particularly
strong. Better alternatives for taxing the financial
sector are likely to be available. 
However, the case is stronger for a tax on financial
transactions in order to limit the negative exter-
nalities of financial transactions. Some financial
transactions are indeed likely to do more harm
than good, especially when they contribute to sys-
temic risk in the financial system. To the extent
that more direct means of curbing harmful trans-
actions are presently unavailable, the introduction
of a financial-transaction tax should be
considered.
However, such a financial-transaction tax should
be very small, much smaller than the negative
externalities in question, because it is a blunt
instrument that also drives out socially-useful
transactions. At the same time, there is a case for
taxing over-the-counter derivative transactions at
a somewhat higher rate than exchange-based
derivative transactions. Countries that currently
levy relatively substantial transaction taxes on
specific segments of the market may wish to
harmonise and therefore lower their rates to a
globally-agreed level.  
More targeted remedies to drive out socially-unde-
sirable transactions should be sought in parallel.
As targeted remedies are implemented, financial-
transaction taxes should be reduced or even
phased out. Thereby, the financial-transaction tax
could provide the financial industry with an incen-
tive to embrace such targeted remedies, even as
the memory of the financial crisis fades.
1. INTRODUCTION
Financial-transaction taxes, just like other taxes,
essentially do two things: first, they raise revenue
and, second, they reduce the activity that is being
taxed. The reason that financial-transaction taxes
are rapidly gaining political traction is that they
would appear attractive on both counts in the cur-
rent post-crisis situation. 
Revenue raising: faced with greatly-increased
debt levels, governments are keen to raise addi-
tional revenues, if possible from the financial
sector, which has contributed to the current global
economic and financial crisis and had to be bailed
out. The political idea here is to make those who
caused the crisis foot at least part of the bill.
Reducing the taxed activity: as a result of the
crisis, there is less confidence in the efficiency of
financial markets. Experts and the general public
are questioning the social usefulness of the rapid
growth in financial-transaction volumes observed
in the past few years. Hence, many no longer
regard the possibility that a financial-transaction
tax might somewhat reduce transaction volumes
as a great concern, and some explicitly welcome
the prospect, regarding financial transactions at
the current level as positively harmful. Darvas and von Weizsäcker FINANCIAL-TRANSACTION TAX: SMALL IS BEAUTIFUL
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According to a recent UK poll (see Box 1), public
support for financial-transaction taxes is indeed
substantial. And, at the December 2009 European
Union summit, European leaders explicitly encour-
aged the International Monetary Fund to consider
a global financial-transaction tax1.
But despite these endorsements, the question
remains whether financial-transaction taxes really
make sense. Intellectually, the idea to introduce
financial-transaction taxes goes back to John
Maynard Keynes (1936) and James Tobin. In
1972, the latter proposed introducing a tax specif-
ically on international foreign-exchange transac-
tions that would act like soft-capital controls by
throwing “grains of sand in the wheels of the
market” (Tobin 1974), thereby enhancing the
policy space for national fiscal and monetary
policy.
But today, only a small number of countries use
financial-transaction taxes, including the UK. Per-
haps the critics are right in arguing that the nega-
tive side effects of financial-transaction taxes
simply outweigh any benefits the taxes might pro-
vide? After presenting some basic facts about the
current volume of financial transactions and the
international experience of transaction taxes in
section 2, we explore this key question in some
detail in section 3. Section 4 concludes and pro-
vides some policy recommendations.
2. SOME FACTS: FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS AND
FINANCIAL-TRANSACTION TAXES
Before we enter into the arguments for and against
financial-transaction taxes in more detail, it is
helpful to look at the amount of financial transac-
tions and the impact of the crisis on trading and
open derivative positions. To this end, we report
available aggregate data on the evolution of finan-
cial-transaction volumes and briefly discuss the
experience with financial-transaction taxes in a
number of countries. 
2.1 Financial-transaction volumes
Financial-transaction volumes have increased
dramatically in recent years. Figure 3 on the next
page presents data on annual turnover for the
main spot and derivatives markets as a ratio of
world GDP2. In 2007, total turnover amounted to
almost 70 times world GDP. The lion’s share of
transactions, 88 percent in 2007, is accounted for
by derivatives trading, of which trading related to
fixed-income securities features prominently.
1. “The European Council
emphasises the importance
of renewing the economic
and social contract
between financial
institutions and the society
they serve and of ensuring
that the public benefits in
good times and is protected
from risk. The European
Council encourages the IMF
to consider the full range of
options, including
insurance fees, resolution
funds, contingent capital
arrangements and a global
financial-transaction levy in
its review.” Conclusions of
the European Council (10-
11 December 2009),
paragraph 15.
2. Unfortunately, data on
turnover and open positions
are not fully comparable
across various markets and
hence Figure 3 should be
interpreted with some
caution.
BOX 1: A RECENT UK OPINION POLL ON FINANCIAL-TRANSACTION TAXES
In early November 2009, Oxfam commissioned a YouGov poll on the support for financial-transaction
taxes in the UK, a few weeks after Gordon Brown had called for the globally-coordinated introduction of such
taxes. Figure 1 gives the support level for financial-transaction taxes, and Figure 2 shows the support for
different measures to consolidate the UK budget, including taxes on financial transactions.
Figure 1: Support for transaction tax (%)
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Spot transactions only amount to about 12 per-
cent of all transactions.
Higher-quality data is available at quarterly inter-
vals for exchange-traded derivatives (excluding
commodity markets). Figure 4 presents turnover
data (in US dollars) for the three main types of
derivatives broken down by geographic region
where available. The key observation from the
figure is that there was an explosion of trading
activity starting in the early 2000s. The crisis
shrunk trading activity by almost one half:
turnover in 2009Q1 was 53 percent of turnover in
2008Q1. By 2009Q3 trading had rebounded
somewhat to 62 percent of the peak level of
2008Q1, which is still several times more than the
market activity levels before 2000.
In addition to the turnover data, we also provide an
overview of the stock of open positions for deriva-
tive contracts. Figure 5 on the next page shows net
open positions at quarterly intervals for exchange-
traded derivatives, whereas data for over-the-
counter derivatives is only available on a gross
basis (Figure 6). Open positions move broadly in
line with the changes in turnover. The explosion in
open positions since the early 2000s, the crisis-
related sharp drop and the partial rebound after
the first quarter of 2009 are clearly discernible.
One important question for our purposes is the
nature of transactions behind the observed explo-
sion in activity, and to some extent also the rea-
sons for the observed sharp drop in response to
the crisis. The development of market infrastruc-
ture and, especially, improvements in information
technologies – which substantially decreased
transaction costs – and parallel financial innova-
tion that created a large variety of derivatives
products, were certainly prerequisites for the
observed developments. But it is unlikely that
these factors alone fully explain the huge explo-
sion in trading as shown in eg Figure 43.
3. It is difficult to measure
transaction costs, not
least because different
investors face different
transaction costs even
from the same financial
intermediary. Appendix
2 of Darvas (2009)
presents transaction-
costs data on the
inter-dealer currency
market for major
currencies and reports
that costs halved from
the 1980s to the 2000s
in the case of several
currency pairs.
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Figure 3: Annual turnover on main financial
markets (World GDP = 1, 1995-2007)
Source: BIS, WFE, IMF. Note: ET=exchange traded; OTC=over-the-
counter; OTC derivatives turnover data and spot-currency
turnover data are based on the BIS triennial survey conducted
in April of every third year. We multiplied by 250 the April daily
average value to get an estimate of annual turnover. Turnover
data for commodity markets is not available.
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Figure 4: Quarterly turnover in exchange-traded derivatives (US$ trillion, 1986Q1-2009Q3)
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There are basically two views regarding the nature
of the explosion in transactions from about 2000
to 2008. One view is that lower transaction costs
simply enabled markets to process information
much more efficiently and in real time, thereby
greatly increasing activity levels. Short-term spec-
ulation and the parallel increase in the liquidity
made markets much more efficient than before.
The other view is that a rather large share of the
additional trading activity is the consequence of
anomalies in financial markets. Some call it
‘excessive short-term speculation’, others draw
attention to flawed incentives4, partly due to
implicit government insurance, while others argue
that the excessively low interest-rate policy of
major developed countries since about 2000 has
fuelled the expansion of money and credit with
subsequent asset-price booms that further fuelled
trading activity. 
What is clear is that the pace of expansion of trad-
ing activity significantly outperformed the pace of
expansion in economic activity, which is clearly
evident from Figure 3 relating financial-market
turnover to GDP. But GDP is a flow concept, and it
would have been informative to relate transac-
tions to the stock of financial assets. Unfortu-
nately, there exist no readily available global
statistics on this, but available evidence suggests
that that annual turnover amounts to twentyfold
or more the stock of financial assets. For example,
the bulk, ie 64 percent, of financial transactions
in 2007 were derivatives related to fixed-income
products. According to BIS data, the worldwide
total notional amount outstanding of all interna-
tional and domestic debt securities (of financial
institutions, corporate issuers and governments),
plus money-market instruments, was US$ 27 tril-
lion in 1995 and US$ 80 trillion in 2007. Deriva-
tives trading related to fixed-income securities
amounted to US$ 345 trillion in 1995 and US$
2,403 trillion in 2007. Hedging and distribution of
interest-rate risk may not be related solely to
fixed-income securities, but also to credit. There
are no readily available statistics on world credit,
but its stock may be between 100 percent and
4. In 2002, ie well before
the crisis, Warren Buffett,
who is one of the most
successful investors in
history and in 2008 was
ranked by Forbes as the
richest person in the world,
raised serious concerns
about the incentives of
market participants
working with derivatives
and specifically warned
about the explosion in
derivatives: “The
derivatives genie is now
well out of the bottle, and
these instruments will
almost certainly multiply in
variety and number until
some event makes their
toxicity clear. Central banks
and governments have so
far found no effective way
to control, or even monitor,
the risks posed by these
contracts. In my view,
derivatives are financial
weapons of mass
destruction, carrying
dangers that, while now
latent, are potentially
lethal.”
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counter derivatives (US$ tn, 1998H1 - 2009H1)
Source: BIS. Note: values shown are notional amounts
outstanding.
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Figure 5: Net open positions for exchange-traded derivatives (US$ trillion, 1986Q1-2009Q3)
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200 percent of world GDP, which was US$ 55 tril-
lion in 2007. Adding the stock of credit to the stock
of fixed-income securities, the resulting sum is
still a tiny fraction of the US$ 2,840 trillion fixed-
income related annual derivatives trading. Fur-
thermore, the bulk of fixed-income derivatives
trading (US$ 1,981 trillion out of US$ 2,403 tril-
lion in 2007) was conducted on organised
exchanges, and hence the ‘hot-potato’ effect often
argued for dealership markets, such as the for-
eign-exchange market, may not be able to explain
the huge rise in transactions.
Obviously, fixed-income derivatives are related
not just to the underlying fixed-income security
and credit but also to hedging other activities. For
example, the hedging of future foreign-currency
risks also has an interest rate dimension that can
be addressed with interest-rates swaps. Interest-
rate swaps are also the ideal means to pursue
‘long duration’ investment strategies by insurance
companies and others. Various interest-rate deriv-
atives are also used to hedge asset-backed secu-
rities and, as their duration can change easily, it
may be necessary to change frequently the hedg-
ing positions. While these and other hedging activ-
ities are generally essential to manage risk, the
huge gap between turnover and the outstanding
stock of assets still presents a puzzle.
Overall, lower transaction costs and financial inno-
vation have clearly helped markets to be more effi-
cient at helping actors follow through on their
economic incentives, thereby leading to massive
increases in financial-transaction volumes. How-
ever, it is less clear to what extent the relevant
actors were all acting in accordance with sound
incentives, which ultimately determines the extent
to which this increase in transactions was accom-
panied by a real increase in economic efficiency.
2.2 Financial-transaction taxes: international
experiences
Many countries have applied financial-transaction
taxes in the past and a limited number of coun-
tries continue to apply financial-transaction taxes
today. These taxes are primarily levied on spot
share trading, but in a few countries, other types
of transactions, including derivatives, are taxed as
well5. The best-known example is the UK’s stamp
duty: it is a 0.5 percent tax on the value of spot
transactions in shares of UK companies. The tax
rate on share trading is one percent in Ireland, 0.5
percent in Korea, while tax rates between 0.15 and
0.3 percent are applied in Australia, Switzerland,
Greece, Hong Kong, India and Taiwan6. The Tai-
wanese transaction tax is rather broad and covers
various kinds of securities, including bonds and
futures contracts (see Box 2 on the next page).
The revenue generated from the tax can be sub-
stantial, with data for the UK, Ireland, Taiwan and
South Africa provided in Table 1.
The collection cost of FTTs is generally very low
due to the electronic execution and settlement of
5. See, for example, Table 1
in Pollin, Baker and
Schaberg 2003, and
Table A1 in Schulmeister,
Schratzenstaller and
Picek, 2008.
6. France also had a tax rate
between 0.15 and 0.30
percent with a
maximum of 610 euros
for each transaction, but
it was abolished on 1
January 2008.
UK Ireland Taiwan South Africa
In GBP bn
% total tax
revenue
In EUR bn
% total tax
revenue
In US$ bn
% total tax
revenue
In US$ bn
% total tax
revenue
2001 2.9 0.9 0.35 1.2 1.9 5.2 0.4 1.6
2002 2.6 0.8 0.30 1.0 2.3 6.5 0.4 1.6
2003 2.6 0.7 0.26 0.8 2.2 5.9 0.6 1.6
2004 2.7 0.7 0.26 0.7 2.8 6.7 1.0 2.1
2005 3.5 0.9 0.32 0.8 2.3 4.8 1.3 2.4
2006 3.8 0.9 0.41 0.9 2.9 5.9 1.5 2.5
2007 4.2 0.9 0.61 1.3 4.1 7.8 1.4 1.9
2008 3.2 0.7 0.42 1.0 3.0 5.5 1.4 1.9
Table 1: Revenues from financial-transaction taxes in four countries (2001-2008)
Sources: HM Revenue & Customs, Revenue Irish Tax & Customs, Ministry of Finance (ROC), South Africa Revenue Services, IFS.
Note: UK data refer to fiscal year.Darvas and von Weizsäcker FINANCIAL-TRANSACTION TAX: SMALL IS BEAUTIFUL
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trades. In the UK, for example, in the fiscal year
2008/2009, the collection cost for all stamp
duties (including on property) was 0.21 pence per
pound raised, while the average for all taxes was
1.1 pence (HM Revenue & Customs Autumn Per-
formance Report 2009). But the collection cost for
stamp duty on share transactions is likely to be
substantially lower since the amount given above
includes collection costs for stamp duty on prop-
erty, which is typically more expensive to collect
(Bond, Hawkins and Klemm 2005).
At the same time, it should be noted that transac-
tion taxes have not been equally successful in
raising revenues everywhere. For example, when
Sweden introduced a financial-transaction tax in
the mid-1980s, revenues were disappointing, not
least because the tax was easily avoided by
moving financial dealings abroad. The extent to
which this is possible depends crucially on the
specific design of the financial-transaction tax. UK
stamp duty, for example, essentially buys legal
certainty. Only once the tax is paid has the trans-
fer of ownership been officially stamped. Of
course, in the UK case, it is still possible to sell a
share to a counterparty abroad so that it leaves
the UK system and can thereafter change hands
without being subject to UK stamp duty. However,
a transaction that exits the system in that way is
in effect charged at a rate of three times the
normal stamp duty, thereby inoculating the
system to some extent against geographic relo-
cation of transactions.
3. SHOULD FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS BE TAXED?
The evidence presented in the previous section
shows that financial transactions have indeed
exploded in many countries, and suggests that
taxing financial transactions remains possible in a
global financial market, although the practical
experience with taxing derivatives – the most rap-
idly-growing segment of financial transactions –
is limited. 
Against this background, we can now turn to the
key policy question of this paper: should financial
transactions be taxed?
From a public-finance perspective, taxes should
essentially be collected for one of two reasons,
which are not mutually exclusive: to raise
revenues for public expenditures and to discour-
age activities deemed to have negative side
effects that are not properly taken into account by
market participants. Taxes levied at least in part
for the latter motive of ‘internalising negative
externalities’ are called Pigou taxes after Arthur
Cecil Pigou, a British economist who proposed
such taxes as a way of correcting market failures. 
In the following, we will argue that the case for a
financial-transaction tax purely to raise revenue
is relatively weak, but the case for a financial-
transaction tax as outlined by Pigou is more
convincing.
BOX 2: FINANCIAL-TRANSACTION TAX RATES AND BASES IN TAIWAN
Taiwan provides an interesting example, because it has FTTs on both spot and derivatives markets.
Securities transaction tax:
0.3 percent for shares or share certificates embodying the right to shares issued by companies. 
0.1 percent for corporate bonds and other securities approved by the government (note: the Taiwanese
government has recently suspended the tax on bond transactions until the end of 2016). 
Futures transaction tax:
Different rates apply depending on type of contract: 
- between 0.0000125 percent and 0.06 percent per transaction on the value of stock index futures
contracts, 
- between 0.0000125 percent and 0.00025 percent per transaction on the value of contracts for
interest rates, 
- between 0.1 percent and 0.6 percent per transaction for options based on premium paid,
- between 0.0000125 percent and 0.06 percent per transaction on the value for other futures contracts.FINANCIAL-TRANSACTION TAX: SMALL IS BEAUTIFULDarvas and von Weizsäcker
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3.1 Revenue-raising taxation
From a pure revenue-raising perspective, the case
for a financial-transaction tax is not particularly
strong. The reason is that a large part of financial
transactions should be regarded as ‘intermediate
production’, not final consumption. Interest rates
swaps, for example, can be a useful hedging tool in
the production process but are not normally
enjoyed as final consumer products.
Generally, financial markets are supposed to allo-
cate two key factors of production, capital and
risk, to the production process. To the extent that
they do so efficiently, taxation of such intermedi-
ate steps of production should typically be
avoided as it is prone to distort production effi-
ciency (Diamond and Mirlees 1971)7. 
But how does this observation square with the
three key arguments often used to support the
revenue-raising rationale of taxing financial trans-
actions? : (1) the financial sector is undertaxed
compared to other sectors and the transaction tax
would remedy this problem; (2) the transaction
tax should raise revenues from the financial
sector, amounting in effect to an ‘insurance fee’
for the systemic risk created by the financial
sector; (3) the revenue collected could be used for
global purposes given otherwise scarce resources,
such as to fund development assistance or global
public goods like climate change. In our view, none
of these three arguments are built on sufficiently
solid ground.
3.1.1 Undertaxation of the financial sector
It is true that the financial sector is difficult to tax.
In part, this is the case because financial-sector
organisations may find it comparatively easy to
shift profits internationally. Another important
factor is that the financial sector is essentially
exempt from value added taxation. The absence of
VAT on financial products is, perhaps ironically,
attributable to technical difficulties in appropri-
ately measuring the value added in financial-
sector products. As a result, the use of financial
services by private households, for example the
borrowing of money as a mortgage, is currently
VAT exempt, contrary to, say, the renting of a car,
which is subject to VAT. However, to address such
problems it may be preferable, in view of the dis-
tortive nature of transaction taxes (see above) to
increase taxation of the financial industry directly.
This could be achieved through an enhanced
regime for taxing profits, dividends and bonuses
and through steps to at least partially include the
financial sector in the VAT regime8. One would
thereby avoid the problem of taxing intermediate
production. Also, one would not have to worry
about an important unknown, namely the inci-
dence of financial-transaction taxes. At this stage,
we still do not have a very good idea of which part
of the financial-transaction taxes would end up
being paid by the financial sector – its sharehold-
ers, managers and employees – and which part
would end up being paid by the rest of society. 
3.1.2 Insurance fee
If such a fee is to be raised, then it should of
course be collected in the way that causes the
least distortion. However, because of the finding
by Diamond and Mirlees cited above, it is indeed
questionable whether from a purely revenue-rais-
ing perspective the transaction tax would be the
best way to collect such fees. And viable alterna-
tives should exist, as explained in the previous
paragraph.
3.1.3Raising revenues for development
assistance or global public goods
Regarding the idea to raise revenues for develop-
ment assistance or global public goods through
transaction taxes, we are also somewhat scepti-
cal. The public finance perspective simply offers
little support for such an approach. The reason is
that earmarking of revenues of a particular tax for
specific purposes risks the misallocation of public
funds: either too much or too little money might
be spent on the specific purpose chosen just
because the revenues from the tax in question
were lower or higher than the optimum level of
spending. In order to avoid such misallocation, tax
revenues should by default be used to fund the
7. If, however, financial
markets are allocating
capital and risk
inefficiently to start
with, then the Diamond-
Mirlees result does not
apply as discussed in
the subsequent section
on Pigou taxation.
8. Huzinga (2002) makes a
concrete proposal on
how to introduce VAT for
financial-sector services
purchased by private
households.Darvas and von Weizsäcker FINANCIAL-TRANSACTION TAX: SMALL IS BEAUTIFUL
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general budget so that the expenditure allocation
can be optimised on the basis of the overall tax
resources that are available, including those
resources spent on global concerns. What is more,
it should be noted that revenues from financial-
transaction taxes would be very unevenly distrib-
uted geographically, with the lion’s share accruing
to a limited number of financial centres. Within the
EU, tax revenues would be extremely concentrated
in the UK and Germany, where over 97 percent of
EU spot and derivate transactions are currently
taking place (see eg Schulmeister et al, 2008).
This makes it particularly unlikely that the UK or
Germany would agree to fund worthwhile interna-
tional activities in proportion to transaction tax
revenues. 
In summary, we are somewhat sceptical at the
suggestion that financial-transaction taxes
should be introduced with the primary objective
of raising revenue.
3.2 Pigou taxation
By contrast, we do see some merit in the case for
a small financial-transaction tax as a Pigou tax if
financial transactions indeed cause negative
external effects that need to be internalised. 
To start with, it may be worth re-stating the well-
known case for a Pigou tax in the case of a nega-
tive externality like environmental pollution.
Without Pigou taxes on the polluting activity, too
much polluting would occur. Banning polluting
activities altogether typically does not make
sense since zero pollution would make the world
very clean but also very poor. What we typically
want is simply to lower pollution so that the mar-
ginal benefit of the activity equals the marginal
pollution cost. To achieve this, regulation might
sometimes be an alternative to Pigou taxation, but
it has two disadvantages. First, it would mean
foregoing the revenues of the Pigou taxes,
revenues that would then have to be raised
through other taxes that cause undesirable dis-
tortions. Second, regulators would often be faced
with the difficult administrative choice about who
should be polluting and by how much. To avoid
that problem, the state could of course sell pollu-
tion certificates, but in many ways that would be
the exact economic equivalent of a Pigou tax. 
Next, the question arises whether financial trans-
actions may actually be accompanied by negative
externalities, in which case a Pigou tax would help.
In parallel, we explore reasons why a Pigou tax
would hurt.
3.2.1Excessive incentives to be faster than
others
One fairly solid argument why there may be too
much investment in financial market infrastruc-
ture was developed by Stiglitz (1988). It is based
on the observation that it will always pay to have
new information faster than other market partici-
pants and then to trade on it. This provides a pow-
erful private incentive heavily to invest in being –
perhaps just a millisecond – faster. This is very
much the reality in financial centres today, with
heavy infrastructure investments in very fast
‘high-frequency trading’ by major market players9. 
While many private investments in information
gathering and processing for private gain also
serve the general public by making markets better
at absorbing information, it is plausible that these
‘arms-race incentives’ may produce ‘too much of a
good thing’. An illustrative example for such over-
investment might be a recent US$ 1.3 billion proj-
ect to lay an optical cable through the Arctic Sea
between the financial centres in London and
Tokyo. The cable would cut latency times for data
transmission from 140 to 88 milliseconds, which
appears to be the main selling point for the finan-
cial sector10. 
‘Financial-transaction taxes should not be introduced with the primary objective of raising
revenue. However, there could be a case for a small financial-transaction tax if financial
transactions cause negative external effects that need to be internalised.’
9. ‘Stock Traders Find Speed
Pays, in Milliseconds’, New
York Times, 23 July 2009.
10. ‘Global warming opens
Arctic for Tokyo-London
undersea cable’, Associated
Press, 21 January 2010.FINANCIAL-TRANSACTION TAX: SMALL IS BEAUTIFULDarvas and von Weizsäcker
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A financial-transaction tax could help to reduce
such over-incentives to invest in being fastest by
discouraging very short-term speculation that
exploits minor information advantages. While this
overinvestment is likely to be only a tiny fraction
of GDP, it may not be an entirely negligible part of
investment for the financial service industry.
3.2.2 Regulation and financial-sector fragility
A powerful argument in favour of transaction taxes
would of course emerge if very low transaction
costs could be linked to the kind of financial sector
instability we have just been through. Krugman
(2009) gives an example of such a link: part of
the fragility of the financial sector observed during
the present crisis was due to the heavy reliance
on short-term arrangements and, more broadly,
excessive systemically relevant leverage. For
example, the financial sector relied to a large
extent on rather short-term financing for its fund-
ing needs (interbank market, commercial paper).
When the market for this short-term funding broke
down, the situation immediately became system-
ically relevant and public intervention was
needed. A financial-transaction tax might have
helped somewhat to discourage such short-term
arrangements. However, as pointed out by Zin-
gales (2009), a tax on short-term debt would be
a better instrument to tackle this particular con-
cern.  But behind this particular example there
might be a more general observation on the inter-
play between financial-sector regulation and
financial-market efficiency. If financial-sector reg-
ulation is sufficiently light to allow substantial
financial innovation, the chances are that it will
be periodically outsmarted by the financial indus-
try, at a cost to the general public. And it is at least
plausible that very low transaction costs facilitate
the thorough exploitation of even relatively minor
regulatory shortcomings. Put differently: trans-
porting tomato ketchup in a leaky (regulatory)
bucket may not be a big problem, but transporting
water is another matter. 
Hopefully, the now obvious and gaping holes in our
regulatory bucket are being mended in the after-
math of the crisis. This should include a more
through treatment of the problem of systemic risk
as we currently understand it and the externali-
ties implied by it. Some highly problematic prac-
tices or products might even have to be banned.
However, historical experience suggests that while
such regulatory improvements are usually suc-
cessful at preventing a repeat crisis, they are
unlikely to be flawless as witnessed by new types
of crisis that emerge. 
Aspects of regulation that we may consider too
small to be important today may suddenly matter
a great deal as markets become ever-more effi-
cient and find new ways to exploit regulatory loop-
holes. Therefore, transaction taxes may be
justified given the uncertainties about future reg-
ulatory problems. And they might, from time to
time, even be able to give regulators a little more
time to think about the holes to be plugged. 
In a sense, this argument is just a variant of the
well-known insight that if there is one inefficiency
in a system – in this case, imperfect regulation –
then more efficiency in the rest of the system
could be a bad thing. However, it need not be. In
sum, this particular argument in favour of a finan-
cial-transaction tax is potentially very important,
but it is also somewhat fragile. But it is probably
fair to say that the crisis has shifted the burden of
proof somewhat. Before the crisis, many people
felt that regulatory imperfections were not an
essential part of the picture. This certainly has
changed, and there are few signs of regulatory
hubris re-emerging arguing that new regulation
will deal with any such problems once and for all. 
3.2.3 Taxation versus controls
Possibly of less relevance for the current debate
but of interest anyway is the original proposal for
a financial-transaction tax on currency trades by
Tobin (1974, 1978). His was in essence a pro-
posal in the context of the ‘holy trinity’ of mone-
tary independence, fixed exchange rates and
capital mobility. His proposed tax would have
acted like a soft form of capital controls, thereby
increasing the autonomy of the national govern-
ment and central bank to manage the businessDarvas and von Weizsäcker FINANCIAL-TRANSACTION TAX: SMALL IS BEAUTIFUL
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cycle without destabilising the exchange rate.
While the underlying problem is of course still rel-
evant today for a number of countries, it may be
hard to justify the introduction of a universal
transaction tax on that basis. However, what
remains is the insight that transaction taxes may
often be an attractive policy when administrative
zero-one choices are inappropriate, as may be the
case with many problems in the financial markets. 
3.2.4 Transaction costs and volatility
One much-discussed question is whether lower
financial-transaction costs lead to lower or higher
price volatility in markets. However, the brief
review of the literature we present in the following
is inconclusive. Therefore, we hesitate to use a
possible link between financial-transaction costs
and volatility either as a strong argument for or
against financial-transaction taxes at this stage. 
Advocates of financial-transaction taxes suggest
that by making short-horizon trading more costly
compared to long-horizon trading, both short-run
volatility (ie ‘noise’) and long-run volatility (ie per-
sistent deviation from ‘fundamental equilibrium’)
decrease; see eg Summers and Summers (1989),
Frankel (1996), Palley (2003) or Schulmeister
(2009). But there is also the opposite argument
that financial-transaction taxes, by reducing
liquidity, risk increasing the volatility of markets;
see eg Mannaro et al (2008). The empirical evi-
dence seems inconclusive at this point. For exam-
ple, Jones and Seguin (1997) show that the
reduction in the commission portion of transac-
tion costs in 1975 led to a decrease in the volatil-
ity of US stock prices, but Liu and Zhu (2009) –
by applying the same methodology as Jones and
Seguin (1997) – find that a reduction of the com-
mission in the Japanese equity markets has
increased volatility. Hau (2006) finds a positive
association between transaction costs and
volatility in the French stock market, Baltagi et al
(2006) for the Chinese stock market, and Aliber
et al(2004) for the foreign-exchange market. Yet
there are also many papers claiming that trans-
action taxes (or transaction costs more generally)
have no significant impact on volatility: Saportan
and Kan (1997) find this for the UK equity market,
Hu (1998) for stock markets in Hong Kong, Japan,
Korea and Taiwan, and Chou and Wang (2006) for
the Taiwanese futures markets11. 
We close this discussion about a possible link
between volatility and transaction costs with a
simple comparison of stock-market volatility for
countries with and without financial-transaction
taxes (Figure 7), which at least does not offer evi-
dence of a very strong cross-country link between
volatility and the taxation of transactions.
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Figure 7: Daily stock market volatility, 1996-2009
Source: authors’ calculations based on data from DataStream. Note: for each year between 1996 and 2009 we calculated the
standard deviation of daily percentage stock-price index changes and then calculated the average of these annual figures.
Countries with current tax rates between 0.15 and 1.0 percent are indicated by arrows.
11. FISCO (2006) also finds
that the debate on the
impact of transaction
taxes on volatility is
inconclusive, and discusses
in detail several
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3.2.5 Trading volume
By contrast, what is fairly clear is that higher
transaction costs will tend to reduce trading
volume. Such a reduction in trading volume would
also tend to go hand-in-hand with a reduction in
market liquidity, which could be a major adverse
consequence of a tax. What is less clear is how
large this effect will be. Figure 8 shows the ratio
of turnover to market capitalisation (a measure
called ‘stock-market velocity’). It shows that coun-
tries with significant transaction taxes do not
have exceptionally low stock-market velocities.
This certainly suggests that the financial-trans-
action tax itself is not the dominant determinant
of trading activity, with other factors driving major
cross-country differences. Those factors would
include other sources of transaction cost, the size
and frequency of shocks to these markets and the
ways in which these shocks are absorbed.
3.2.6Increased cost of funding for the real
economy
But probably the most obvious and direct argu-
ment against transaction taxes is that they would
increase the cost of funding for the real economy
via the stock market. While the precise extent to
which this would occur remains unclear, there
exists some literature studying this effect. For
example, Umlauf (1993) finds that a one-percent
tax on share trading in Sweden led to a fall in stock
prices by 2.2 percent on announcement of the
measure. According to that study, the cumulative
fall in stock prices might even have been as high
as five percent when the period prior to the
announcement is taken into account. By contrast,
Oxera (2007) calculates much more marked
effects using a stylised model that seeks to esti-
mate the net present value of future transaction-
tax obligations for UK-listed companies. On that
basis, the study suggests that the 0.5-percent tax
in the UK would be depressing stock prices by as
much at 8 to 12 percent12.
In a simple version of this simulation approach,
the calculated impact depends essentially on the
stock-market velocity, which varies considerably
across different markets, as shown by Figure 8.
For example, if the stock-market velocity is one,
with each stock on average being turned over once
per year, a 0.5-percent tax amounts to a financial
burden of 0.5 percent of stock-market capitalisa-
tion per year. If this burden is repeated every year,
and assuming an interest rate of, say, four per-
cent, the net present value of the burden would
amount to a towering 12.5 percent of the value of
the stock. 
Of course, with the much smaller tax rates that we
12.In support of this
approach, Bond,
Hawkins and Klemm
(2005) find empirically
that more heavily traded
stocks tended to be
impacted more by a
change in transaction
tax in the UK, though the
magnitude of the
estimated effect is
rather small.
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Figure 8: Stock-market velocity (ratio of annual turnover to market capitalisation, average of 2003-09)
Source: WFE. Note: countries with current tax rates between 0.15 and 1.0 percent are indicated by arrows.
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suggest as more appropriate in the following, the
burden would be proportionately smaller. For
example, for a 0.01-percent tax rate, the net pres-
ent value of the transaction tax burden – even for
German stocks with a stock-market velocity of
about 1.8 – would amount to a mere 0.45 percent. 
3.3 Why a financial-transaction tax should be
small
Given the possible advantages of taxing some and
the disadvantages of taxing other transactions,
the first-best solution would of course be to use
targeted instruments to deal with any negative
externalities, while leaving those with no exter-
nalities untouched. However, assuming for now
that only a uniform transaction-tax instrument is
available, the pros and cons discussed above raise
the difficult question of how to manage the trade-
off. In the transaction-tax debate, this trade-off is
traditionally operated by simple assertion and
counter-assertion, which tends not to be very
illuminating. 
Instead, we offer a fairly robust a-prioriargument
for why the optimal financial-transaction tax
should be small – much smaller than the exter-
nalities in question – but not zero. 
The reason for this lies in the geometry of the
welfare losses and gains caused by the tax. In
Figure 9a, the welfare loss induced by such a
small tax t is depicted for all those transactions
that do not imply a negative externality. This
welfare loss, represented by the red area,
increases and decreases in proportion to the
square of the small tax t. The reason is that one
side of this triangle is equal to the small tax titself.
And the height of the triangle, viewed from that
side, varies with the price elasticity of demand,
and is proportional to t.
By contrast, the positive welfare effect of a small
transaction tax where a negative externality is
present is depicted as the blue area of Figure 9b.
To understand this figure, it should first be noted
that the externality is depicted here as diminish-
ing social demand for the good. The quantity
chosen by the market is defined by the point
where supply equals private demand. By contrast,
the socially optimal quantity is substantially
lower, defined by the point where supply equals
social demand. At the original market outcome,
the marginal damage done to welfare is exactly
equal to the size of the negative externality, which
is represented by the maximum height of the blue
area. In our calculation, we can take the average
height of the blue area to be constant for small t13.
At the same time, the width of the blue area is the
variation in the quantity demanded in response to
13. To be precise, the
average height decreases
as tincreases, but this
simply adds a negative
term in tsquared to the first
order term in tin the
formula for the blue area.
This term in tsquared can
then be neglected for small
tfor the remainder of the
argument.
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Figure 9b: Welfare effect of a small tax in the
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the small tax t, which is again proportionate to the
price elasticity of tand to t. As a result, the overall
size of the blue area varies in proportion to t for
small tax rates.
With this, we can now show that is it always pos-
sible to pick a small but non-zero tax which is suf-
ficiently small for the welfare benefits of the tax to
exceed the welfare costs. Formally, we look for the
range of taxes where the blue area is bigger than
the red area. 
Blue area > Red area
ConstantBluet > ConstantRedt2
> t > 0
Of course, the scale of the drawings in Figure 9a
and 9b might in reality be very different, for exam-
ple if there were only very few transactions that
carried a negative externality but very many car-
rying a positive one. However, such a difference in
scales would merely influence the constants
above and call for an even smaller t, but the basic
result would be unaltered. Within this very basic
framework – which can be generalised further - we
therefore find that a range of positive but small
financial-transaction taxes will always exist that
would lead to a welfare improvement14. 
The intuition for this finding is that a very small tax
will only prevent very marginally useful ‘good’
transactions while at the same time driving out
‘intra-marginally’ and therefore significantly ‘bad’
transactions. Therefore, the welfare gain from driv-
ing out these bad transactions will initially domi-
nate. Using an analogous argument it can also be
seen why it would not be optimal to fully inter-
nalise the externality by setting the Pigou tax at
the level of the negative externality. The reason for
this is that when the Pigou tax is already close to
the level of the negative externality, further
increases will only drive out marginally ‘bad’ trans-
actions while driving out significantly useful ‘good
transactions’. 
It is worth noting that this logic in favour of a small
14.The most important
hidden assumption
underlying this result is
that financial
transactions either exert
a negative externality or
no externality at all.
Logically, there also
exists the possibility for
financial transactions to
imply a positive
externality. Obviously,
when both positive and
negative externalities
are present, little can be
said about the sign of
the tax. However, at
least at this stage
transactions with
positive externalities do
not feature prominently
in the transaction-tax
debate.
Pigou tax on financial transactions applies irre-
spective of whether short-term or long-term trans-
actions are more likely to carry a negative
externality. To the extent that there are reasons to
believe that short-term speculative transactions
are more likely to imply a negative externality, the
optimal small Pigou tax will be just a little higher.
4. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we find that there is a case to be
made in favour of a small Pigouvian financial-
transaction tax. However, it should be substan-
tially smaller than the externalities in question. To
address tax avoidance through financial innova-
tion or geographic relocation, the full range of
financial transactions – including derivatives –
should be covered and the introduction of the tax
should be globally coordinated.
If such a globally-coordinated, very small but
broad-based financial-transaction tax were to be
implemented, countries that currently levy rela-
tively substantial transactions taxes on specific
segments of the market, in particular on stock
transactions, may wish to harmonise and there-
fore lower their rates to the globally-agreed level
in order to minimise distortions.
However, we also find that such an optimal finan-
cial-transaction tax can only be expected to very
partially internalise any negative external effects.
Therefore, more targeted remedies for the ineffi-
ciencies in question should in any event be
sought in parallel to introduction of the tax. To the
extent that such targeted remedies are available
and implemented, any financial-transaction tax
might eventually be reduced or even phased out.
In that sense, the financial-transaction tax might
provide the financial industry with an  incentive to
embrace such targeted remedies. 
This political-economy observation somewhat
defuses the difficult question whether a second-
best or even third-best solution such as the finan-
cial-transaction tax should be considered at all
before all the more targeted measures have been
exhausted. In fact, the financial-transaction tax
ConstantBlue
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might stimulate interest in first-best regulation
even as the memory of the financial crisis fades. 
The targeted first-best measures will of course
need to include better regulation and supervision
of the financial industry. But they may also
include more targeted tax incentives. For example,
it may be possible to measure and to tax systemic
risk directly, as suggested for example by Acharya
et al (2009). Such levies may, for example, be
used to fund a financial-sector bailout mecha-
nism, as is currently under discussion in Sweden
and can be argued to be at the heart of the recent
Obama proposal to tax large banks based on their
leverage. 
Even within a financial-transaction tax system,
differentiation in rates of tax is possible and could
be a useful means to make the system more tar-
geted and effective. In particular, one may wish to
consider taxing over-the-counter derivative trans-
actions at a somewhat higher rate than exchange-
based derivative transactions15. Substantively,
this could be justified on account of the lesser
transparency and greater systemic risks that
over-the-counter transactions might entail. And
such tax incentives could nicely complement the
ongoing legislative action on both sides of the
Atlantic to encourage centralised clearing for
derivatives.
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